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Abstract  
We document that switching from laissez-faire production to public procurement 
in residential waste collection in Finland reduces the number of firms active in 
the local market, but induces a statistically significant and large decrease in unit 
prices on average. While public procurement, thus, seems to be desirable from 
the citizens’ perspective, not all municipalities adopt public procurement. We 
provide descriptive evidence that municipal council composition is associated 
with the chosen regime. This suggests that local politics may be one obstacle for 
the efficient provision of local public goods. 
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1 Introduction 
What form of market organization results in the most efficient provision of local (impure) 
public goods? If an efficient solution can be identified, what prevents policymakers from 
implementing it? We tackle these fundamental questions in the context of household waste 
collection, a classical example of local impure public good, using data from Finnish local 
governments. 
The markets for household waste collection are organized very differently in different 
countries, and their organization may vary across jurisdictions within countries (see Simões 
and Marques 2012a and 2012b for overviews). The typical organizational forms can be 
categorized in three groups. First, at the one end of the spectrum is public provision of waste 
collection where local jurisdictions directly provide these services to all households using 
their own employees and capital, and the local government funds the service from its budget.1 
At the other end of the spectrum is a laissez-faire arrangement where private firms can enter 
and exit freely and negotiate the prices and service levels directly with the households.2 
Between these extremes exist various regulatory arrangements where private firms operate 
the services but local government controls to varying extent the prices, service levels, and 
details of production. A typical form of this market organization type is public procurement. 
Private firms participate in competitive bidding to resolve which firms will provide the 
service, and how much they are paid for that. Our paper studies the effects of switching the 
market organization form from laissez-faire production to public procurement. We show that 
such a switch reduces the number of firms active in the local market, but also induces a 
statistically significant and large decrease in unit prices. 
                                                      
1 In many countries, local governments collect waste specific taxes or fees. 
2 Even in laissez-faire, the market is still often subject to various kinds of regulation, for 
example regarding recycling, disposal and storage. We are interested in comparing different 
regimes of household waste collection in otherwise similar regulatory environment.   
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The arguments in favor of public provision typically mention better possibilities to 
utilize economies of scale, density or contiguity (Edwards and Stevens 1978; Stevens 1978).3 
For example, many different firms could be collecting waste from the same street resulting in 
suboptimal logistics under laissez-faire. There could also be excess negative externalities in 
the form of congestion and noise. On the other hand, private sector is likely to benefit from 
many positive incentives absent in the public provision that arise due to better performance 
and effort being reflected in the personal wealth of employees and owners (see, e.g., Alchian 
and Demsetz 1972 and Spann 1977 for a general treatise, and Bennet and Johnson 1979 in the 
context of waste collection). The possible issues related to the public choice models of 
bureaucracy, where bureaucrats are able to extract rents from public provision, are absent in 
laissez-faire (Niskanen 1971).  Negotiating with each household separately is costly but 
allows tailoring the service levels according to heterogeneous preferences of the households. 
Finally, private production creates incentives to innovate and be efficient in order for the 
firms to survive the tests of the competitive market. 
Taken these arguments together, it seems that in theory, a well-organized public 
procurement arrangement may be able to achieve the best of both worlds: realizing the 
relevant economies by well-planned contracts and the desirable incentives related to private 
firms operating in the competitive environment. Moreover, a bidding process may be able to 
induce competitive pressure even in some cases where the laissez-faire does not. This is 
important especially in the case of a natural monopoly which may often arise in waste 
collection services in small municipalities.4   
                                                      
3 Economies of scale refer, for example, to being able to use the collection vehicles to their 
full capacity. Economies of density refer, for example, to being able to organize the service 
such that one vehicle can operate in a small area. Economies of contiguity refer, for example, 
to being able to organize the service such that one vehicle collects waste from all the 
households along a given route.  
4 According to a Finnish private sector industry expert, a new entrant needs about two 
hundred households as customers to able to cover the investment in a single collection 
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In practice, public procurement may not be the optimal solution. For example, 
corruption or lack of expertise among the local government officials planning the contract 
and the procurement mechanisms may result in various inefficiencies that would be absent in 
the laissez-faire solution (Bandiera et al. 2009; Cai et al. 2013). Thus, ranking these systems 
in terms of performance is an empirical question. We compare prices and market structure 
faced by the households in public procurement and laissez-faire. Differentiating from 
previous literature (see Simões and Marques 2012a and 2012b for recent surveys), we do not 
compare municipalities in a cross-section. We use a difference-in-differences strategy to 
evaluate how changing the system affects prices relative to a price change in a control group 
of status quo municipalities. Thus, the first contribution of this article is that we are able to 
address at least some endogeneity issues that much of the existing evidence suffers from. We 
find that moving from laissez-faire to publicly procured waste collection reduces consumer 
prices by between 17 and 37 percentage, depending on the specification. This result is not 
that surprising given that waste collection is unlikely to suffer from the issues of incomplete 
contracts (Hart et al. 1997) that plague contracting out of many other types of public services 
(Andersson et al. 2018).  
We also find some evidence suggesting that the active number of firms decreases with 
moving to public procurement. This result together with the price effect suggests that the 
public procurement system is able to maintain competitive pressure even if the market 
production is allocated only to one or few firms per municipality at the time. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
vehicle. This means that a new entrant would have to capture a large market share 
immediately in many small Finnish municipalities. This is not an easy or cheap task under 
laissez-faire given that each household needs to be attracted in one-to-one negotiations. On 
the contrary, in public procurement, an entrant can bid for the entire (or a large enough) 
market on even terms with the incumbent.   
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While a price reduction is arguably desirable from the citizens’ and even the welfare 
perspective, only roughly half of the local governments have a publicly procured system.5 In 
the second part of the paper, we try to shed some light on the following logical inconsistency: 
If public procurement is better than free markets in household waste collection, why is it that 
many local governments still stick to the laissez-faire system? 
We find that municipality characteristics such as population or population density are 
not systematically and robustly correlated with the regime choice, nor are variables 
measuring municipal financial status. On the contrary, municipal council characteristics have 
more robust predictive power. This descriptive evidence suggests that political economy 
considerations may prevent governments from adopting best practices in the provision of 
public goods or services. A number of papers have studied the role of politics and interest 
groups on outsourcing decisions in general and in residential waste collections in particular 
(see, e.g., Bel and Fageda 2007 and 2009 for surveys concerning all services, and Dubin and 
Navarro 1988 and Walls et al. 2005 for studies on waste collection). We contribute to this 
literature by studying the decision between public procurement and laissez-faire instead of 
public provision and outsourcing as usual. 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some 
of the previous theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 introduces our data and the 
institutional framework of this study. Empirical findings are presented in Sections 4 and 5. 
                                                      
5 There are four caveats to this interpretation. First, we do not observe quality differences, in 
particular, collection frequencies and failures to collect. According to industry experts we 
interviewed there is very little variation across municipalities and regimes in this respect. 
Second, while a lower procurement price means lower burden for residents, it also lowers 
profits for the firms. However, higher price can lead to under-provision of the services from 
the welfare perspective. Third, there may be small differences in what services the prices 
contain under different regimes, such as whether washing the cans is included in the price. 
These small differences are very unlikely to explain the large effect of the regime on the 
prices. Fourth, our data does not allow us to analyze the effects in the long run. 
  5
Finally, Section 6 concludes. Auxiliary tables and figures are organized in an Online 
Appendix. 
2 Previous Literature 
Investigating the efficiency of household waste collection has interested economists and 
public administration researchers for long. Among the earlier studies, Hirsch (1965) analyzes 
the relationship between waste collection costs and the type, location and financing of 
services in the city of St. Louis. Kemper and Quigley (1976) study the impact of market 
structure on costs in Connecticut. The main, but not only, limitation of these and other studies 
of the era is very limited data. Stevens (1978) and Edwards and Stevens (1978) use more 
comprehensive data sets but conduct only cross-sectional analysis. They find that competitive 
contractual arrangement is associated with lower prices than either provision by public 
monopoly or the laissez-faire. On the contrary, Bennett (1979) compares private and public 
providers within jurisdictions and finds the private somewhat more efficient in Fairfax 
County, U.S. 
In a more recent study, Ohlsson (2003) argues that controlling for selection in producer 
choice changes the results from private providers being more efficient to public ones being 
more efficient in Sweden, although his identification rests on functional form assumptions. 
Other more recent studies find no differences in costs of service delivery. Callan and Thomas 
(2001) provide evidence from municipalities in Massachusetts, and Dijkgraaf and Gradus 
(2003) study Dutch cities. Bel and Costas (2006) use data from a sample of Spanish 
municipalities to show that privatization of waste management may yield some cost savings 
in short run, but these savings are eroded over time. For comprehensive surveys, we refer to 
Simões and Marques (2012a and 2012b). 
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The results from previous literature appear to be sensitive to the quality of the data, the 
empirical specifications and which country is analyzed, but the majority of these studies finds 
that the private sector is more efficient than the public. However, a crucial weakness in 
previous literature is that almost no analysis using even regime changes for identification 
have been conducted so far, let alone as-good-as-random designs. One exception is the study 
by Máñez et al. (2016). They use a matching strategy to estimate the effect of switching from 
public provision to public procurement on costs. They find that a switch induces short term 
costs but is better in the long run. 
Another important question in the existing literature is why governments choose certain 
ways to deliver the services. Bel and Fageda (2007, 2009) survey earlier literature on the 
determinants of privatization of public services in general. They summarize that fiscal stress 
and production cost concerns are associated with privatization decisions. Moreover, the 
pressure from interest groups has predictive power whereas political ideology does not. 
However, more recent work finds support for the claim that also political partisan interests 
matter (see Bel and Fageda 2017 for a survey). For example, Elinder and Jordahl (2013) 
report that political color is associated with school privatization decisions in Sweden, and 
Zafra-Gómez et al. (2016) highlight the role of politics in privatization of municipal water 
services in Spain.  
Dijkgraaf et al. (2003), Bel and Miralles (2003), Dubin and Navarro (1988), and Walls 
et al. (2005) study the privatization decisions in the context of waste collection markets. 
Findings of Bel and Miralles (2003) and Walls et al. (2005) emphasize the importance of 
economic and pragmatic considerations such as fiscal stress whereas the other two studies 
find evidence of also political ideology and the role interest groups also predicting the 
decisions. Our contribution is that instead of privatization decisions, we study the economic 
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and political determinants of the choice between public procurement and laissez-faire. This is 
a relevant margin especially in many non-European countries, such as the United States. 
3 Institutional Framework and Data 
Local governments have an important role in Finland. On average, they spend about five 
thousand euros per capita annually. The local public sector employs around one fifth of the 
Finnish workforce, while the central government employs only around five percent. Besides 
organizing waste management, municipalities are responsible for many social and health 
services, education and urban planning. In this section, we describe the institutional 
framework and our data in detail. 
 
3.1 Waste Collection in Finnish Municipalities 
Municipalities organize waste management either independently or via a municipal 
cooperation (Jätelaitos). There may be variation within the cooperation on whether the 
involved municipalities use public procurement or laissez-faire, but it is quite common that 
all municipalities within the same cooperation use the same system.6 In the case of a 
cooperation, contracts for all involved municipalities are typically put out to public 
procurement at the same time. However, the winners for each municipality are decided 
independently (no joint bidding allowed). Especially the waste collection in small 
municipalities is auctioned as a single contract with single winner. Some larger municipalities 
may be divided to several areas that are auctioned separately. It is also possible, although not 
common, that one area in a municipality is auctioned, and another area operates under 
laissez-faire. The contracts usually last for five years. In some rare cases, auction decisions 
                                                      
6 To address these correlated choices, we show the robustness of the results to clustering the 
standard errors at the cooperation level in the Appendix (Figures A1-A2 and Tables A8-
A11). 
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are appealed to the Market Court. If that is the case, the contracts are auctioned as temporary 
contracts. 
The bids are in unit prices. The winners are determined solely based on prices, but there 
are minimum quality and license requirements. There are different prices for collecting 
different types of waste (for example, general waste, glass, bio-waste, and metal). Many 
details of operations, such as pick-up frequencies, are predetermined. The total bid for 
comparison is determined by multiplying the unit prices by the number of times each type of 
can is emptied annually. We use data only on the unit price of emptying a general waste can. 
In the period we analyze, there was one dominant firm (Lassila & Tikanoja), in the 
waste management market with about 20% percent market share. The second largest firm, 
SITA, had a market share of about 4%. Both of these firms were operating nationwide. There 
were also several hundred very small and local firms. 
 
3.2 Local Politics 
Decision-making in Finnish municipalities is led by local councils that are responsible for the 
operation and economy of the municipality. Decisions are taken by a simple majority of the 
council members. Municipalities in Finland do not have stable governing coalitions. Instead, 
the political parties form coalitions on an issue-by-issue basis.  The municipal council 
appoints a municipal executive board to prepare decision-making, but the final decisions are 
made by the councils. All the parties get seats in the board proportional to their seat shares in 
the council. Municipal councils are elected in municipal elections that are organized every 
fourth year. The council's term starts at the beginning of the next calendar year and ends at 
the end of the next election year. The municipal elections held in 2004 were dominated by 
three large parties from the political left, center and right: The Social Democratic Party, the 
Center Party, and the National Coalition Party, respectively. 
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3.3 Data 
Our waste collection data are constructed from various sources. The price measure employed 
in our main analysis is the unit cost of emptying a trash can of 600 liters. Comparable price 
data are available only for four years and they come from surveys conducted by the Finnish 
Association of Local Authorities, Kuntaliitto (Paajanen and Mynttinen 2005, 2006, 2007, 
2008).7 Annual information on contracting systems adapted by the municipalities comes from 
the Finnish Solid Waste Association (Jätelaitosyhdistys). These data are further merged with 
the number of waste collection firms in each municipality obtained from our own survey 
directed at local solid waste associations (Tukiainen and Mälkönen 2010).  
We classify the municipalities in two groups based on the market organization they 
have: Municipalities with laissez-faire, and municipalities that have procured the household 
waste collection in the entire municipality or at least parts of it. The prices are higher in 
municipalities with laissez-faire, 8.31 euros (N = 268), than under competitive contracting, 
7.64 euros (N = 413). Moreover, there are slightly more firms in the municipalities with free 
markets, 2.53 (N = 478), compared to 1.50 (N = 493) in the municipalities with public 
procurement. 
One potential limitation of the data is that perfectly comparable price information 
across different systems and municipalities is hard to obtain. For example, while focusing on 
the unit cost of emptying a trash can of 600 liters gives a comparable unit price, it may also 
exclude municipalities that dominantly use smaller cans from the sample, such as 
                                                      
7 The data collection ended after 2008 when the authors Paajanen and Mynttinen both retired. 
Some price data is also available for years 2002, 2003 and 2004. However, a different legal 
regime is in place during these years, and thus, the information may not be directly 
comparable. In the old regime, the municipality was responsible for the waste, in the new 
regime, the waste producers are responsible. 
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municipalities with low population density.8 It may also be that the conducted price surveys 
target different types of households across municipalities. These issues can be alleviated to 
some extent by looking at changes within municipalities over time rather than across 
municipalities in a cross-section. Moreover, both systems may exhibit costs not included in 
the prices and not present in another system. For example, washing of the bins is included in 
public procurement prices but may be separately charged in laissez-faire. Bias in an opposite 
direction may result from the public procurement prices excluding administrative costs 
related to the public procurement process and planning the contract. However, also the 
laissez-faire system excludes costs that the households have from negotiating the contract, 
whereas such costs are absent in the public procurement case. While acknowledging these 
limitations, we conclude that any possible issues remaining after we focus on the within-
municipality variation are very unlikely to explain the entire effect we find. 
Finally, we exploit data on population and local public finances from Statistics Finland. 
In order to study the political determinants of contracting systems, we also use candidate-
level election results from the Ministry of Justice for the 2004 election, as well as data on 
candidates’ municipal employment status from KEVA (a Finnish municipal employee pension 
fund).  
4 Effects of Market Organization Form on Prices and Entry 
4.1 Empirical Strategy 
To evaluate the effects of public procurement (as opposed to laissez-faire) on prices and the 
number of active firms in waste collection, we will first show results from simple pooled 
OLS regressions. These estimates can be given a causal interpretation only if we have 
                                                      
8 We concentrate on the 600 liters cans, as our data have the best coverage for these prices. 
Nevertheless, the results are robust if we use the price of emptying 240 liters cans instead 
(see the Appendix Table A6). 
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included all municipality-level covariates that are correlated with both the outcome and the 
treatment dummies. This is a rather strong assumption and therefore, one should treat the 
estimates merely as correlations. Typically, the literature has relied on similar cross-sectional 
evidence. Thus, it is interesting to compare the OLS estimates to those resulting from a more 
reliable research design. 
In order to obtain more credible results, we estimate the following generalized 
difference-in-differences specification: 
௠ܻ௧ 	ൌ 	ߚ1ሾܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ	݌ݎ݋ܿݑݎ݁݉݁݊ݐሿ௠௧ ൅ ߙ௠ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ࢄᇱ௠௧ࢽ ൅ ݁௠௧. 
Here, ௠ܻ௧ is the outcome of interest, and 1ሾܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ	݌ݎ݋ܿݑݎ݁݉݁݊ݐሿ௠௧ is a dummy for using 
public procurement in the entire municipality or at least some parts of the municipality. ߙ௠ 
and ߣ௧ are the municipality and time fixed effects, respectively. They capture municipality-
specific time-invariant characteristics, and annual shocks common to all municipalities such 
as inflation. ࢄᇱ௠௧ is a vector of covariates, and ݁௠௧ is the error term in municipality m at time 
t. The main coefficient of interest ߚ tells how much the prices (or the number of firms) 
change when a municipality switches from the laissez-faire to public procurement relative to 
a possible simultaneous price change in a municipality that maintained the status quo of 
laissez-faire policy. In order to facilitate the estimation of the specification with municipality 
fixed effects, we only include municipalities with at least two observations of the outcome. If 
the standard common trends assumption is satisfied, we can give the estimates a causal 
interpretation. Otherwise, the estimates only imply a conditional correlation.  
We illustrate the switches between alternative systems in the data in Appendix Table 
A1. It is more common that a municipality switches the system from laissez-faire to public 
procurement. Effectively, the effect of public procurement on prices is identified from a 
smaller number of observations than the transition matrices would suggest. We have data 
before and after the system change from 23 municipalities, after we have made the sample 
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restrictions described above. We observe the number of firms before and after the reform for 
48 municipalities that switch their form of market organization. 
 
4.2 Effects on Prices 
We begin our empirical assessment by plotting the average prices before and after changing 
the market organization form in Figure 1. We also match these data with prices in 
municipalities that do not switch their system during the period of our analysis. To do so, we 
construct weighted averages of prices where the weights are based on the number of 
observations concerning each year in our data.  Indeed, it appears that switching to a publicly 
procured system reduces prices. Note that there are relatively few observations two years 
before changing the system as well as two years after the change. However, even looking at 
the prices right before and immediately after the public procurement suggests a reduction in 
the waste collection prices. The prices in municipalities with laissez-faire are relatively 
stable, but perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the prices in municipalities that always have 
public procurement are sloping upwards. 
In Table 1, we move on to the regression analysis. First, the pooled OLS results that 
having a mixed system or publicly procured waste collection is negatively associated with 
prices (columns (1)-(3)).9 The coefficients indicate that unit prices are between 0.72 and 0.82 
euro lower in public procurement municipalities than laissez-faire municipalities. Relative to 
the constant, this implies from 10.5 to 13.1 percentage difference. In columns (4)-(6) we 
report the difference-in-differences estimates. They suggest that government intervention 
through public procurement leads to a decrease of between 1.39 and 3.05 euro in unit prices. 
                                                      
9 Restricting the pooled OLS sample to the same sample as we use in the difference-in-
difference estimations affects the estimation results only marginally (see Table A2 in the 
Appendix).   
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Given that the mean price under laissez-faire is 8.32, the decrease is between 17 and 37 
percentage. 
In Online Appendix A, we report the difference-in-differences results using two 
alternative samples. First, we show that the estimated effect is similar in a sample that 
includes only those municipalities that switch from laissez-faire to public procurement and 
those that always have laissez-faire. Second, we limit our analysis to only the municipalities 
that switch their system at least once between 2005-2008. Again, the empirical results are 
similar to those reported in this section (see Table A3). In Appendix Table A4, we add data 
from years 2002-2004 to our estimations. We show that including these data from somewhat 
different regulatory environment does not alter our conclusions. 
The difference-in-differences approach is valid if the common trends assumption is 
met, i.e., the outcomes in the switching municipalities would have evolved in the same way 
as those in the control group of non-switching municipalities if the switching municipalities 
had not switched. An indirect test for this assumption is whether there are no diverging pre-
treatment trends between the treatment and the control group. We study whether this criterion 
is satisfied by estimating the results including municipality-specific time trends (e.g., Angrist 
and Pischke 2009). The estimation results controlling for the municipality-specific time 
trends are reported in columns (6) and (12). While the magnitude of the estimates increases 
after including the municipality-specific time trends, the estimated effect remains negative 
and statistically significant. Note that the estimation sample changes slightly from what we 
had before, as we need at least three observations per municipality in order to estimate a 
model with the municipality-specific time trends. This as well as losing degrees of freedom 
increases the standard errors.10 
                                                      
10 Another way to test the validity of the results is to include leads of the treatment variable in 
the estimation equation. We discuss this test in Appendix A (Figure A3). The results there are 
as expected and support the validity of the design. 
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Figure 1. Prices before and after public procurement. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Regression results for prices. 
  
  Pooled OLS  DID 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] -0.822*** -0.723*** -0.823*** -1.394*** -1.424*** -3.046***
[0.247] [0.235] [0.259]   [0.243] [0.250] [0.487]   
Constant 7.739*** 5.529*** 7.865*** 
[0.217] [2.095] [2.223]          
N 681 681 681 604 604 438 
R2 0.06 0.15 0.33  0.11 0.12 0.63 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Region dummies No No Yes No No No 
Municipality FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends No No No No No Yes 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share of young and old inhabitants. 
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3 Effects on Number of Firms 
Different practices in household waste collection may not affect only the prices but also the 
market structure. We analyze this aspect next. Figure 2 plots the mean number of firms 
before and after switching form laissez-faire to public procurement in household waste 
collection. We see that the number of waste collection firms declines slightly after a 
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municipality switches to publicly procured waste collection. Furthermore, it seems that there 
could be some anticipation of the upcoming change in the market organization form, as the 
average number of firms goes down already before the switch. The figure also shows that 
municipalities that always have public procurement have less firms than municipalities that 
always have a laissez-faire system. 
We verify that having publicly procured waste collection is negatively associated with 
the number of firms active in the municipality in Panel A of Table 2. As before, one should 
think of the estimates in columns (1)-(3) rather as correlation than causal estimates. The 
estimates from the fixed effects specifications (columns (4)-(6)) suggest that switching from 
decentralized to centralized system induces a small though statistically significant reduction 
in the number of firms, although it should be noted that this decrease is rather small.11 
We have also estimated an alternative model where the dependent variable is a dummy 
for a municipality having a monopoly or a duopoly in waste collection (see Table A7 in the 
Appendix). The difference-in-differences estimate without municipality-specific time trends 
suggests that adapting the publicly procured system increases the likelihood of having a 
waste collection monopoly by 19 percentage points (p < 0.05). Controlling for the 
municipality-specific time trends, this effect goes down to 15.8 percentage points (p < 0.10). 
Similarly, adopting a publicly procured system increases the likelihood of a municipality 
having a monopoly or a duopoly by 18.3 percentage points when not controlling for the 
municipality-specific time trends (p < 0.01), and by 13.8 percentage points when controlling 
for the trends (p < 0.05). Thus, the decrease in the number of firms could be happening at a 
very important margin. This also raises the concern that larger firms might be able to cause 
smaller firms to exit. We address this potential outcome of procurement in Panel B of Table 
                                                      
11 This result is mainly mechanical as most of the municipalities are auctioned to one firm. A 
better measure of competition in the public procurement case could be the number of bidders 
which we, unfortunately, do not observe. 
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2, where we check whether the contracting system makes it more likely that Lassila & 
Tikanoja (L&T), the largest waste management firm active in Finland, is active in the local 
waste collection market. If anything, we observe a negative association in the OLS 
regression, but this relationship vanishes completely in the difference-in-differences 
specification. Therefore, the public procurement system does not seem to favor or penalize 
the largest firm to any noticeable extent. 
In Appendix Table A5, we report the results on firm effects using the same alternative 
samples as discussed in the previous subsection. We find that the effect of public 
procurement on the number of firms is very similar if we drop the municipalities that always 
have public procurement out of the estimation sample. 
 
Figure 2. Number of firms before and after public procurement. 
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Table 2. Regression results for firms. 
  
Panel A: Number of firms 
Pooled OLS DID 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] -1.037*** -1.160*** -1.055*** -0.350** -0.361** -0.290** 
[0.197] [0.188] [0.225]   [0.145] [0.140] [0.137]   
Constant 2.467*** 4.485*** 1.91 
[0.170] [1.360] [1.437]          
N 971 971 971 968 968 954 
R2 0.10 0.18 0.44  0.07 0.14 0.75 
Panel B: L&T is active on the market 
Pooled OLS DID 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1[Public procurement] -0.060 -0.096** -0.090** -0.013 -0.015 0.005 
[0.049] [0.043] [0.038]   [0.016] [0.016] [0.011] 
Constant 0.426*** 1.860*** 1.584*** 
[0.036] [0.397] [0.424]          
N 1298 1298 1298 1292 1292 1270 
R2 0.01 0.21 0.43  0.01 0.02 0.66 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Region dummies No No Yes No No No 
Municipality FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends No No No No No Yes 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share of young and old inhabitants. 
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
Publicly procured waste collection decreases the number of firms acting in the local market 
but also yields an economically meaningful and statistically significant reduction in waste 
collection prices compared to a laissez-faire system. Moreover, the public procurement does 
not seem to favor large firms over small ones. 
One potential caveat in the analysis is that part of the effect could also be due to 
inaccuracy in the price measure and potential overestimation of prices in decentralized 
systems. However, it is unlikely that only these reasons would be behind the effects that are 
this large. Moreover, it seems that quality differences in the waste collection from the 
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household’s perspective seem limited. It does not seem plausible that waste collection firms 
would behave very differently from each other in the actual process of emptying the trash 
cans. Moreover, in both regimes, the overall regulation in Finland is quite strict on how the 
waste collection must be organized. The key consideration for customers is probably how 
often the waste is collected. We measure unit costs, and thus, our comparison should be fairly 
robust to quality concerns.  
Besides informing directly on the optimal form of organizing waste collection, our 
results have wider implications for the optimal impure public good market organization as we 
provide an example where government involvement seems to bring efficiency gains. Our 
results are also related to literature on how to run procurement auctions, for example, whether 
to allow more or less buyer discretion regarding which firms are allowed to bid (Coviello et 
al. 2017; Hyytinen et al. 2017). 
5 Predictors of Market Organization Form 
If public procurement of waste collection can reduce the unit prices, which is arguably 
desirable from the citizens’ point of view, why do some municipalities stick with the worse 
alternative? As the decision is carried out by (elected) local politicians, one obstacle may be 
the political representation of groups with preferences against public procurement. Another 
reason to study the determinants of organization form is that the price effect we find could be 
overestimated if the switching municipalities have, for some unknown reason, benefited more 
from switching the system than the potential future switchers. We can alleviate this concern 
to some extent by analyzing what explains switching. If variables that are likely to affect the 
costs of production (for example, population density) or the benefits of switching (for 
example, population size) do not explain regime choice, it seems less likely that the regime 
change takes place substantially more in places that benefit the most. 
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We stress that the analysis in this section is merely descriptive. Further quasi-
experimental work is needed to establish any results with a causal interpretation. Given the 
descriptive nature of our analysis, we do not aim to test specific hypotheses, but rather merely 
provide explorative evidence and ex-post interpretations of the patters in the data.  
Table 3 provides summary statistics on the municipalities with a publicly procured 
market organization and those with a laissez-faire. There are some differences between the 
municipalities with different systems. For example, procurement municipalities are slightly 
larger than the laissez-faire ones. This is perhaps somewhat odd as small municipalities are 
likely to suffer most from the natural monopoly issues of laissez-faire discussed earlier. 
Moreover, it appears that municipalities with different market organization forms in waste 
collection could have a different local political landscape. 
Next, we analyze the predictors of market organization form in a regression framework. 
The analysis in Table 4 pools together all years for which we have data on market 
organization form in household waste collection. However, we cluster the inference at the 
municipality level to avoid unnecessary precision due to using many observations of the same 
municipality and council term. Therefore, our analysis can be seen as looking at the average 
of the public procurement dummy over the electoral term. We regress a dummy for having a 
publicly procured system on different sets of variables, and control for year fixed effects. 
Some of the council characteristics have predictive power on regime type even when 
including the other municipal characteristics. Moreover, the R2 increases substantially. It goes 
up from 0.04 to 0.11 when council characteristics are added to a model with municipal 
population and financial characteristics. The increase is much smaller the other way around 
(from 0.10 to 0.11). Overall, the evidence suggests that political considerations are more 
important than those related to the costs and benefits of the regime type.  
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In Table 5, we study the predictors of switching from laissez-faire to public 
procurement. We concentrate on the samples for which we observe the price, that is, the 
council term 2005-2008. We further limit the estimation sample to those municipalities that 
switch their system from laissez-faire to public procurement or always maintain laissez-faire 
in columns (4)-(6). First, we define a dummy that gets value 0 if a municipality does not 
switch from laissez-faire to public procurement during years 2005-2008, and value 1 if it 
does. Second, we use only one observation per municipality. Thus, the coefficients are 
informative about how the variables predict switching at any point during the council term. 
Now, population and financial characteristics seem to be as important as political 
characteristics as predictors of the market organization form.  
While the correlational analyses in Tables 4 and 5 provide a somewhat ambiguous 
message, it is safe to say that the political variables predict the system choice. The single 
most robust predictor in these analyses is the Left Alliance seat share which seems to be 
negatively associated with adopting public procurement in household waste collection. When 
the reference group is the (center-right) National Coalition Party, increasing the Left Alliance 
seat share by one percentage point is associated with slightly over one percentage point 
reduction in the likelihood of a municipality having publicly procured waste collection (Table 
4). In a median-sized council with 27 local councilor, this would mean that taking one seat 
away from the National Coalition Party and giving it to the Left Alliance is associated with 
five percentage points lower likelihood of having public procurement. The results in Table 5, 
on the other hand, suggest that adding one more Left Alliance councilor (and taking away 
one National Coalition Party councilor) would be associated with almost nine percentage  
points (-0.023*100*(1/27)*100) lower likelihood of switching from laissez-faire to public 
procurement in the richest specification (6). This seems perhaps unexpected, as public 
procurement is less market-oriented than laissez-faire, and the Left Alliance is the most left-
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leaning party among the major Finnish parties. However, it may be that left-wing politicians 
consider public procurement as a case of sleeping with the enemy, and thus, dislike it the 
most. It could also be the case that they are more interested in preventing public procurement 
in important sectors, such as health care and education. Thus, they might dislike experiences 
with public procurement in other areas, even if it might come with positive consequences. 
 
Table 3. Choice of organization form, descriptive statistics. 
  
  Laissez-faire  Procurement     
Variable N Mean Std. dev.  N Mean Std. dev.   Difference
Municipality characteristics 
Population 640 10522 20472 658 17651 52629 -7129 
Population density 640 0.56 0.43 658 0.60 0.41 -0.04 
Landfill 640 0.17 0.38 658 0.19 0.39 -0.02 
Share of young population 640 17.37 3.85 658 17.05 3.34 0.32 
Share of old population 640 19.97 4.69 658 19.75 5.11 0.22 
Expenditure per capita 640 4840 791 658 4945 799 -106 
Deficit per capita 640 5 219 658 -14 265 19 
Municipal income tax rate 640 18.79 0.59 658 18.69 0.77 0.09 
Council characteristics 
Municipal employees % 640 20.97 7.87 658 22.36 9.32 -1.39 
Incumbents % 640 58.55 9.64 658 58.08 9.02 0.48 
Women % 640 35.76 8.40 658 37.50 8.29 -1.74* 
Center Party % 640 44.45 18.65 658 37.43 22.72 7.02*** 
National Coalition Party % 640 16.45 10.78 658 17.61 10.87 -1.16 
Social Democratic Party % 640 19.98 12.09 658 21.98 10.65 -2.00 
Left Alliance % 640 9.20 8.18 658 6.26 7.32 2.93*** 
Christian Democratic Party % 640 2.43 3.79 658 3.19 3.54 -0.76* 
Green Party % 640 1.67 3.15 658 2.42 3.95 -0.75* 
True Finns % 640 1.09 3.40 658 0.78 2.60 0.31 
Other parties % 640 3.28 9.95  658 4.37 8.79   -1.10 
Notes: Differences in means are tested using a t-test adjusted for clustering at the municipality level.  *, ** and 
*** mark statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Predictors of organization form, regression analysis. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Population/10,000 0.003 -0.005 
[0.017] [0.018]    
(Population/10,000)^2 0.000 0.000 
[0.000] [0.000]    
Population density 0.041 0.052 
[0.085] [0.092]    
Share of young population -0.021* -0.008 
[0.012] [0.013]    
Share of old population -0.015 -0.008 
[0.012] [0.012]    
Landfill -0.076 -0.024 
[0.064] [0.063]    
Expenditure per capita 0.000 0.000*   
[0.000] [0.000]    
Deficit per capita 0.000 0.000 
[0.000] [0.000]    
Municipal income tax rate -0.072** -0.036 
[0.036] [0.036]    
Center Party seat share -0.005*** -0.004*** 
[0.001] [0.001]    
Social Democratic Party seat share -0.003 -0.003 
[0.003] [0.003]    
Left Alliance seat share -0.013*** -0.014*** 
[0.003] [0.003]    
Christian Democratic Party seat share 0.008 0.008 
[0.008] [0.008]    
Green Party seat share 0.002 -0.002 
[0.008] [0.010]    
True Finns seat share -0.006 -0.007 
[0.008] [0.008]    
Other parties seat share 0.000 0.000 
[0.003] [0.003]    
Municipal employees' seat share 0.005* 0.005*   
[0.003] [0.003]    
Incumbents' seat share -0.002 -0.002 
[0.003] [0.003]    
Women's seat share 0.003 0.003 
[0.003] [0.003]    
N 1298 1298 1298 
R2 0.04 0.10 0.11 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy for having publicly procured waste 
collection. All specifications control for year fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at the municipality level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Switching to public procurement over the council term.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Population/10,000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000*   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
(Population/10,000)^2 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000**  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Population density -0.128 -0.037 0.162 0.354*   
[0.091] [0.094] [0.162] [0.197]    
Share of young population 4.602** 3.209* 4.227 5.276*   
[1.772] [1.774] [2.582] [2.694]    
Share of old population 0.000 -0.007 -0.021 0.002 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.023] [0.026]    
Landfill 0.102 0.153** 0.029 0.103 
[0.067] [0.065] [0.138] [0.132]    
Expenditure per capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Deficit per capita 0.000*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Municipal income tax rate 0.108*** 0.113*** 0.120 0.153**  
[0.030] [0.031] [0.077] [0.072]    
Center Party seat share 0.005** 0.003 0.000 -0.001 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]    
Social Democratic Party seat share 0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.008 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006]    
Left Alliance seat share -0.007** -0.010*** -0.028*** -0.023*** 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006]    
Christian Democratic Party seat share -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025 -0.005 
[0.007] [0.006] [0.016] [0.016]    
Green Party seat share 0.005 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 
[0.006] [0.008] [0.016] [0.017]    
True Finns seat share 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.011 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]    
Other parties seat share 0.007*** 0.006** 0.003 0.006 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]    
Municipal employees' seat share 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.006 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005]    
Incumbents' seat share -0.005* -0.005* -0.003 -0.011**  
[0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005]    
Women's seat share 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.005 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]    
N 219 219 219 99 99 88 
R2 0.22 0.20 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.50 
Sample Price FE regressions Always laissez-faire and switchers 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy for switching to publicly procured waste collection. Each municipality is included 
only once. Columns (1)-(3) use data from the municipalities that are included in the price FE regressions. Columns (4)-(6) 
restrict the sample further to the municipalities that always have laissez-faire or switch to public procurement and for 
which prices are observed. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper shows that public procurement of household waste collection reduces the number 
of firms acting in the local market but also induces an economically and statistically 
significant drop in waste collection prices compared to a decentralized system. Thus, the 
results are suggestive that public procurement is likely to be desirable from the citizens’ 
perspective. Yet, only around half of the local governments have adapted a centralized 
system. 
We provide a potential explanation for this paradox by analyzing the correlates of 
organizational form descriptively. We show that municipal council characteristics predict the 
choice of organizational form. This suggests that political economy concerns may be one 
obstacle to efficient provision of public goods. In essence, our results speak to two 
fundamental questions in public finance and political economy: What should the government 
do, and why does this not happen. 
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Table A1. Transitions between laissez-faire and public procurement. 
        
Panel A: Full data 
    t-1 
Laissez-faire Public procurement 
t Laissez-faire 595 3 
Public procurement 58 578 
Panel B: Price observed 
    t-1 
Laissez-faire Public procurement 
t Laissez-faire 247 2 
Public procurement 40 361 
Panel C: Number of firms observed 
    t-1 
Laissez-faire Public procurement 
t Laissez-faire 462 1 
Public procurement 47 436 
 
 
Table A2. OLS results restricting the analysis to the difference-in-differences sample. 
        
Panel A: Price 
  (1) (2) (3) 
1[Public procurement] -0.865*** -0.783*** -0.864*** 
[0.264] [0.251] [0.270]    
Constant 7.609*** 4.593* 7.809*** 
[0.208] [2.525] [2.675]    
N 604 604 604 
R2 0.08 0.17 0.37 
Panel B: Number of firms 
  (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] -1.045*** -1.168*** -1.059*** 
[0.198] [0.189] [0.226]    
Constant 2.471*** 4.473*** 1.905 
[0.170] [1.363] [1.441]    
N 968 968 968 
R2 0.10 0.18 0.44 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes 
Region dummies No No Yes 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share of 
young and old inhabitants. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are 
reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table A3. Effect on prices using alternative samples. 
        
Panel A: Switchers and always laissez-faire 
  (1) (2) (3) 
1[Public procurement] -1.479*** -1.561*** -3.669*** 
[0.354] [0.380] [0.976]    
N 304 304 198 
R2 0.10 0.11 0.53 
Panel B: Only switchers 
  (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] -4.036*** -3.927*** -4.929**  
[1.132] [1.209] [2.365]    
N 119 119 97 
R2 0.33 0.39 0.71 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends No No Yes 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share 
of young and old inhabitants. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level 
are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table A4. Effects on prices including data from 2002-2008. 
               
Pooled OLS DID 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] -0.998*** -0.916*** -0.670*** -0.716*** -0.735*** -0.776*** 
[0.172] [0.160] [0.186]   [0.127] [0.126] [0.224]   
Constant 6.544*** 3.418** 5.482*** 
[0.172] [1.492] [1.534]          
N 1230 1230 1230 1049 1049 1049 
R2 0.18 0.27 0.41  0.28 0.29 0.54 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Region dummies No No Yes No No No 
Municipality FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends No No No  No No No 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share of young and old inhabitants. 
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A5. Effect on firms using alternative samples. 
        
Panel A: Switchers and always laissez-faire 
  (1) (2) (3) 
1[Public procurement] -0.369** -0.364** -0.320**  
[0.144] [0.141] [0.136]    
N 603 603 599 
R2 0.12 0.13 0.74 
Panel B: Only switchers 
  (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] -0.829*** -0.816*** -0.636*** 
[0.178] [0.149] [0.120]    
N 182 182 182 
R2 0.22 0.29 0.80 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends No No Yes 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share of 
young and old inhabitants. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are 
reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table A6. Effects on prices using 240-liter trash can as outcome price unit. 
  Pooled OLS  DID 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] -0.499*** -0.465*** -0.498*** -0.454*** -0.451*** -0.817***
[0.113] [0.109] [0.111]   [0.127] [0.128] [0.240]   
Constant 4.558*** 2.918*** 3.946*** 
[0.084] [0.820] [0.764]          
N 637 637 637 562 562 372 
R2 0.10 0.19 0.44  0.10 0.10 0.55 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Region dummies No No Yes No No No 
Municipality FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends No No No No No Yes 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share of young and old inhabitants. 
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A7. Effects on having a monopoly or a duopoly in waste collection. 
               
Panel A: Monopoly 
Pooled OLS DID 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] 0.253*** 0.299*** 0.213*** 0.193** 0.190** 0.158* 
[0.058] [0.053] [0.055]   [0.084] [0.083] [0.095] 
Constant 0.432*** -1.541*** -0.224 
[0.042] [0.416] [0.441]          
N 971 971 971 968 968 954 
R2 0.06 0.22 0.50  0.06 0.07 0.65 
Panel B: Monopoly or duopoly 
Pooled OLS DID 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1[Public procurement] 0.236*** 0.276*** 0.210*** 0.186*** 0.183*** 0.138** 
[0.050] [0.046] [0.042]   [0.070] [0.067] [0.060]   
Constant 0.647*** -0.238 0.393 
[0.040] [0.349] [0.336]          
N 971 971 971 968 968 954 
R2 0.08 0.20 0.42  0.07 0.10 0.75 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Region dummies No No Yes No No No 
Municipality FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends No No No No No Yes 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share of young and old inhabitants. 
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
In Figure A1, we show in the Finnish map which municipalities have public procurement 
system (or the mixed system) and which have laissez-faire. In Figure A2, we show which 
municipalities switch the system between 2005 and 2008. Both of the maps indicate heavy 
clustering of regime choices and switching decisions. This is because many municipalities 
organize waste management via municipal cooperation organizations and these organizations 
tend to take similar decisions for all or most of the municipalities involved. This will 
potentially lead to issues of clustering at the cooperation level. In Tables A8-A11 we study 
the robustness of all the main results to clustering the statistical inference at the cooperation 
level. The inference is robust. 
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Table A8. Effects on prices, standard errors clustered at the cooperation level. 
  Pooled OLS  DID 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] -0.822** -0.723* -0.823*** -1.394*** -1.424*** -3.046***
[0.407] [0.382] [0.282]   [0.214] [0.230] [0.502]   
Constant 7.739*** 5.529** 7.865*** 
[0.377] [2.551] [2.258]          
N 681 681 681 604 604 438 
R2 0.06 0.15 0.33  0.11 0.12 0.63 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Region dummies No No Yes No No No 
Municipality FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends No No No No No Yes 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share of young and old inhabitants. 
Standard errors clustered at the cooperation level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A9. Effects on firms, standard errors clustered at the cooperation level. 
               
Panel A: Number of firms 
Pooled OLS DID 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1[Public procurement] -1.037* -1.160** -1.055**  -0.350 -0.361 -0.290 
[0.546] [0.544] [0.487]   [0.325] [0.315] [0.232] 
Constant 2.467*** 4.485*** 1.910 
[0.489] [1.087] [1.370]          
N 971 971 971 968 968 954 
R2 0.10 0.18 0.44  0.07 0.14 0.75 
Panel B: L&T is active on the market 
Pooled OLS DID 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1[Public procurement] -0.060 -0.096 -0.090**  -0.013 -0.015 0.005 
[0.088] [0.074] [0.039]   [0.021] [0.021] [0.015] 
Constant 0.426*** 1.860*** 1.584*** 
[0.078] [0.555] [0.544]          
N 1298 1298 1298 1292 1292 1270 
R2 0.01 0.21 0.43  0.01 0.02 0.66 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Region dummies No No Yes No No No 
Municipality FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality-specific time trends No No No No No Yes 
Notes: Population controls include population and squared population and share of young and old inhabitants. 
Standard errors clustered at the cooperation level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A10. Predictors of market organization form, standard errors clustered at the 
cooperation level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Population/10,000 0.003 -0.005 [0.018] [0.022]    
(Population/10,000)^2 0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000]    
Population density 0.041 0.052 [0.112] [0.117]    
Share of young population -0.021 -0.008 [0.020] [0.017]    
Share of old population -0.015 -0.008 [0.016] [0.015]    
Landfill -0.076 -0.024 [0.064] [0.062]    
Expenditure per capita 0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000]    
Deficit per capita 0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000]    
Municipal income tax rate -0.072 -0.036 [0.058] [0.052]    
Center Party seat share -0.005* -0.004 [0.003] [0.003]    
Social Democratic Party seat share -0.003 -0.003 [0.004] [0.004]    
Left Alliance seat share -0.013** -0.014**  [0.006] [0.006]    
Christian Democratic Party seat share 0.008 0.008 [0.011] [0.011]    
Green Party seat share 0.002 -0.002 [0.009] [0.010]    
True Finns seat share -0.006 -0.007 [0.007] [0.007]    
Other parties seat share 0.000 0.000 [0.003] [0.003]    
Municipal employees' seat share 0.005* 0.005*   [0.003] [0.003]    
Incumbents' seat share -0.002 -0.002 [0.003] [0.003]    
Women's seat share 0.003 0.003 [0.004] [0.004]    
N 1298 1298 1298 
R2 0.04 0.10 0.11 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy for having publicly procured waste 
collection. All specifications control for year fixed effects. Standard errors 
clustered at the cooperation level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A11. Predictors of switching market organization form, standard errors clustered at the 
cooperation level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Population/10,000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000*   
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
(Population/10,000)^2 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000**  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Population density -0.128 -0.037 0.162 0.354 
[0.106] [0.102] [0.172] [0.220]    
Share of young population 4.602* 3.209* 4.227 5.276*   
[2.678] [1.889] [3.077] [2.891]    
Share of old population 0.000 -0.007 -0.021 0.002 
[0.020] [0.016] [0.029] [0.029]    
Landfill 0.102 0.153** 0.029 0.103 
[0.068] [0.064] [0.137] [0.123]    
Expenditure per capita 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Deficit per capita 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Municipal income tax rate 0.108 0.113* 0.120 0.153*   
[0.071] [0.058] [0.104] [0.078]    
Center Party seat share 0.005 0.003 0.000 -0.001 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]    
Social Democratic Party seat share 0.001 0.003 -0.005 -0.008 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005]    
Left Alliance seat share -0.007 -0.010* -0.028*** -0.023*** 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007]    
Christian Democratic Party seat 
share 
-0.025* -0.024** -0.025 -0.005 
[0.013] [0.011] [0.018] [0.019]    
Green Party seat share 0.005 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.017] [0.015]    
True Finns seat share 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.011 
[0.013] [0.012] [0.016] [0.014]    
Other parties seat share 0.007** 0.006* 0.003 0.006 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]    
Municipal employees' seat share 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.006 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004]    
Incumbents' seat share -0.005** -0.005** -0.003 -0.011**  
[0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.005]    
Women's seat share 0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.005 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]    
N 219 219 219 99 99 88 
R2 0.22 0.20 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.50 
Sample Price FE regressions Always laissez-faire and switchers 
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy for switching to publicly procured waste collection. Each municipality is included 
only once. Columns (1)-(3) use data from the municipalities that are included in the price FE regressions. Columns (4)-(6) 
restrict the sample further to the municipalities that always have laissez-faire or switch to public procurement and for 
which prices are observed. Standard errors clustered at the cooperation level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** mark 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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To test the validity of the design, we add two leads of the treatment variable to our 
regressions. If the difference-in-differences approach is valid, the coefficients of these leads 
should not be statistically different from zero. That is to say, future reform should not affect 
current prices. Formally, we estimate regressions of the form 
 
௠ܻ௧ 	ൌ ∑ ߠఛ1ሾܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ	݌ݎ݋ܿݑݎ݁݉݁݊ݐሿ௠௧ାఛ ൅ ߙ௠ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ࢄᇱ௠௧ࢽ ൅ ݁௠௧.଴ఛୀିଶ   (A.1) 
 
If the empirical design is valid, ߠఛs with ߬ ൏ 0 should be zero while for the first treatment 
year and after switching the system there may be an effect. We plot the estimates for different 
ߠఛs in Figure A3. Panel A shows that there is a clear negative effect on the prices during the 
first year of publicly procured waste collection. The point estimates of the two leads are not 
statistically significantly different from zero, as should be the case. Based on Panel B, it 
seems surprisingly like there is no effect on the number of firms at all. However, the 
estimates also come with very wide confidence intervals. Moreover, the sparsity of our data 
suggests that the results should be taken with a grain of salt. 
 
 
Figure A3. Regression results including two leads. 
 
Notes: Figure shows estimated effect of public procurement for each year and their 95 % 
confidence intervals using specifications (5) in Tables 1 and 2. 0 marks the first year with 
public procurement in household waste collection. We control for population, squared 
population and share of young and old citizens. Moreover, specifications include 
municipality and year fixed effects. N = 522 in Panel A and N = 854 in Panel B. 
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